The baseline copus of a new multimodal database, acquired in the framework of the FP6 EU BioSec Integrated Project, is presented. The corpus consist of fingerprint images acquired with three different sensors, frontal face images from a webcam, iris images from an iris sensor, and voice utterances acquired both with a close-talk headset and a distant webcam microphone. The BioSec baseline corpus includes real multimodal data from 200 individuals in 2 acquisition sessions. In this contribution, the acquisition setup and protocol are outlined, and the contents of the corpus -including data and population statistics-are described. The database will be publicly available for research purposes by mid 2006.
Introduction
Research on biometric systems has experienced an important growth in the last years. In the case of individual biometric traits such as fingerprint, face, and voice, this has been promoted by the availability of biometric databases developed for international benchmarks such as Fingerprint Verification Competitions, NIST Facial Recognition Technology Evaluations, and NIST Speaker Recognition Evaluations [1] . In the same way, the progress on multimodal biometric systems relies heavily on the availability of multimodal biometric databases.
There are already a few multimodal biometric databases publicly available.
Some of them consist of only matching scores produced by several biometric systems operating on different modalities [2] . While these databases encourage research on multimodal fusion, they prevent research on individual systems and even on fusion at other levels than score fusion. In this communication we focus on the more general and common case of multimodal databases consisting of biometric signals. In this respect, prominent examples are: XM2VTS [2] , including face and voice; MCYT [3] , including fingerprint and handwritten signature; and BIOMET [4] , which contains samples of face, voice, fingerprint, hand and handwritten signature. These previously existing databases had several limitations that the BioSec baseline corpus tries to overcome. In particular the BioSec baseline corpus tries to overcome the absence of important traits (e.g., iris), sensors (e.g., sweeping fingerprint sensors), and informed forgery simulations (e.g., voice utterances pronouncing the PIN of another user) in existing multimodal databases.
As compared to unimodal databases, the collection of multimodal databases implies some additional or extended challenges, namely: the design of the contents typically requires a complex multidisciplinary approach, the acquisition campaign is very resource-and time-consuming, there is a need for cooperation of a large group of donators spanning a period of time, and the legal issues regarding data protection are especially controversial [1] . One of the main goals of the European project BioSec [5] is to create a large multimodal database overcoming these difficulties by the integrated efforts of over 20 partners with accumulated experience in biometric database acquisition, personal data protection, performance evaluation, and usability and user acceptability issues. Other personal data acquired in the first session and stored securely and independently of the biometric data included: name, age, gender, handedness, manual worker (yes/no), vision aids (glasses, contact lenses, none), and English proficiency (low, foreign language, native). A time log of the different acquisition files was also stored. The "manual worker" group includes all users having eroded fingerprints, as identified by the contributors themselves when asked about the state of their fingerprints. The use of glasses, contact lenses or none of them refers to regular use. The donators using glasses wore them for the face capture but removed them for the iris acquisition.
Acceptance and usability data was also gathered during the acquisition by using electronic questionnaires. The questionnaires included over 50 questions related to attitude, security and privacy, background, scenarios, and enrolment. More details and results of the acceptance and usability studies can be found in [5] .
Description of BioSec baseline
Examples of typical images in BioSec baseline are given in the central part of Fig. 1 (different traits corresponding to different random subjects) . Selected biometric samples with very low image quality are given in the right column of Fig. 1 .
Although the corpus was carefully collected by specially designed software and a human supervisor at all times, there was still the possibility of software or human errors. In order to ensure that the BioSec baseline corpus was conformed to the acquisition protocol, all acquired biometric samples were manually verified by a human expert. The samples non-compliant with the acquisition protocol were either corrected or removed according to the following rules:
• If a user lacks an important part of his/her biometric data (approximately more than 20% of all the genuine samples), then the user is not included in BioSec baseline, i.e., it is rejected.
• If a user lacks a reduced number of genuine samples (approximately less than 20%), then the samples are copied from valid samples of the same user. Therefore some identical samples appear in BioSec baseline.
• In the particular case of utterances of a user pronouncing the 8 digit number of another user to simulate informed forgeries, the expert verifying the database produced the samples missing or invalid with his own voice.
Worth noting, low quality samples, even of the poorest quality but complaint with the acquisition protocol were neither rejected nor corrected.
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Statistics about rejected and corrected users and samples are given in Fig. 2, which also includes population and session statistics.
----- Fig. 2 --- LG IrisAccess EOU3000 session1 session1 session1 session2
7-3-7-7-0-0-0-9 7-3-7-7-0-0-0-9 7-3-7-7-0-0-0-9 7-3-7-7-0-0-0-9 minutes days 0.00% 
